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INTRODUCTION 
How does one evaluate the important public values and impacts 
of things that do not have a market price and then integrate them into 
the fabric of our system of social governance? That question lies 
within most or all of Joseph Sax's work over the years. 
Copyright © 1998 by ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY. 
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; A.B. Princeton 1965, J.D. Yale 
1968, L.L.M. Michigan 1974, S.J.D. Michigan 1981. My graduate work at Michigan was 
molded by Professor Sax's perceptive and unstinting guidance. Many of my subsequent 
academic and legal practice projects-including the notorious Snail Darter endangered 
species litigation noted herein, legal work for the State of Alaska after the Exxon-Valdez 
spill, and an environmental coursebook-have been described as deeply Saxist. This pres-
entation was originally scripted as a slide show, then owing to time pressures it ultimately 
was presented as a slide-show-without-slides, an ambience which may linger in this text. 
The reader's indulgence is appreciated. I thank Patrick Nickler, Lance Davis, Scott 
Cernich, Harry Bader, Scott Cooper, and Laura Jensen for their help on this piece, and Joe 
and Ellie Sax for all they have given me over nearly 30 years. 
411 
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This essay contains two very different parts. At the Association 
of American Law School's symposium on Professor Sax's work, so 
ably organized in San Francisco by Professor Lazarus, I was assigned 
the endangered species portfolio. Because Sax has written little that is 
specifically focused on endangered species, however,l it seemed wise 
to range wider. The first Part of this Article represents an attempt to 
distill some of Joseph Sax's intellectual dimensions, beyond those al-
ready chronicled in the comments of other contributors to this sympo-
sium, with some linked themes and observations drawn from Sax 
beyond his writings. 
The second Part, instigated by several of Sax's articles, presents 
"The Three Economies," a theoretical construct for understanding the 
interplay between the marketplace, nature, and the overarching public 
interest. As a new way to frame the classic elements of a long-running 
debate, the three economies construct suggests how nonmarket values 
and costs should be integrated into the political life of a society and be 
reflected in competent economic analysis. Built on well known con-
cepts of environmental economics, the three economies proposition 
may help clarify ongoing analysis of what environmental law means, 
both for now and for the sustainable future. 
I. 
JOSEPH SAX AS INTERGENERATIONAL EDUCATOR 
A. Hiking With Sax Is Not Just Hiking: Ecophilosophical Quests 
A characteristic moment in the outdoor life of Joseph Sax: he is 
backpacking on a rugged trail along an escarpment of the Bruce Pe-
ninsula high above Lake Huron's Georgian Bay, the vein of sandstone 
and marble that forms Niagara Falls and then runs two hundred miles 
northwest through Ontario before rising and plunging into the lake. 
Sax stands quiet on the high ledge, looking out at the blue lake 
stretching to the horizon and the water 200 feet below so crystal clear 
that he is not sure whether the two loons down there are flying slowly 
or swimming fast. The place is beautiful and desolate, but it's also hot 
and the black flies are fierce. Sax's companion has lagged behind, 
scratching unhappily at mosquito and black fly welts in every exposed 
place. When he catches up to Sax, the companion says, "Nice 
view ... but this is miserable, this heat, these bugs." Sax ignores this. 
He turns and says: "You know, I've been wondering: Would this place 
feel any different to us if we knew that in the bedrock five hundred 
1. Sax, Using Property Rights to Attack Environmental Protection, 14 PACE ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1 (1996)(primarily a critical analysis of extreme Wise Use congressional proposals 
for regulatory compensation, with an eight-paragraph addendum noting the bare bones of 
the Department of Interior's endangered species "incidental-take" permit program). 
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feet below the lake, totally imperceptible to us, there was a high speed 
tunnel carrying six lanes of traffic back and forth between Canada and 
the US?" 
This is not normal hiking banter. Many years later, I retain only a 
vague memory of that Bruce Peninsula escarpment, and the loons, 
and the heat, and the mosquitoes, and the black flies, but I vividly 
recall Sax's question. I have used it with my students, trying with 
them to figure out what it is about wilderness that makes a society 
want to protect it.2 
The moment is quintessential Sax. He is interested in far more 
than physical places; he invests place and time with probing questions. 
B. Sax and Ecological Civics: Thinking Beyond the 
Logic of the Marketplace 
As one of the first environmental law professors in the United 
States, Sax has repeatedly confronted the basic differences between 
insider and outsider perspectives, between on one hand the economic 
and political marketplace structures, which make the dominant daily 
decisions for a society, and on the other the richly interconnected nat-
ural context of human society as seen by ecologists, environmentalists, 
and other citizens to which the marketplace may pay no heed.3 
Here is Sax on another hike, in the steep hills of Tennessee's 
Cumberland Plateau, standing with his wife Ellie on one of the 
scalped "bench" cuts ringing the sides of Red Oak Mountain. Moun-
tains in this area stand like multilayered pyramidal chocolate cakes, in 
which coal seams one to eight feet thick lie flat, one above the other, 
separated by five to a hundred feet of shale and earth, covered with 
lush mountainside ecosystems. Significant amounts of coal can be 
taken cheaply with dynamite and bulldozers by carving benches 
around the sides of the mountains atop the coal outcroppings, pushing 
the tree and soil "overburden" over the side, and opening the way for 
front-end loaders to shovel up the coal and drive it away. 
After this lucrative, "low-tech" strip mining is finished, the moun-
tain is left a tortured moonscape, descending in ragged steps to the 
valley below. Sulfuric shale, runoff water, and the rubble of soil and 
2. Walter Mitty-like, I belatedly have added my own responsive socratic question, 
with a photograph of a stark, beautiful alpine desert plateau in the northern Rockies, rug-
ged rocks, gnarled pinon pines, but with jet contrails traced in the sky above the wilderness 
landscape: If you are a month out from civilization in a desert, or the Alaskan tundra, and 
look up to see the jet contrails of the 6:00 TWA London-to-Tokyo executive flight, serving 
martinis at nine hundred miles an hour, what effect does that have upon whatever you are 
feeling there in the wilderness, and why? 
3. The term "marketplace" is used here in the broad sense, to denote the complex 
system of economics and politics that dominates the practicalities of the daily life of indi-
viduals and the nation. 
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trees slides down the hillside, filling the valley below, poisoning the 
streams, covering the bottomland agricultural fields of the mountain 
communities that remain, and swelling the seasonal floods.4 
The companies that stripmined the mountain simply followed the 
dictates of the marketplace (including the neutralization of govern-
ment regulatory controls). To the marketplace, prior to serious en-
forcement of federal laws, cut-and-run strip mining made economic 
sense, because it was not capital intensive and the coal could be sold 
at very high rates of profit above land and excavation costs.5 Full res-
toration of the mountain is impossible, but even the minimum reme-
dial steps required by state and federal law are commonly evaded. As 
one miner said, "Hell, it costs $5,000 an acre to get a stripmine bench 
returned to contour with some vegetation on it, and but for coal that 
land wouldn't cost even $250 an acre in the first place." The market-
place inherently does not account for societal values that cannot be 
bought and sold. Instead, it seeks to avoid accountability for the 
wastes and externalized costs that flow from marketplace decisions. 
In market terms, then, the mountains of the Cumberlands become in 
effect a national sacrifice area, their only significant value lying in the 
hydrocarbons they contain for immediate consumption. 
But when Sax looks out at Red Oak Mountain, he sees beyond 
the economic and political marketplace, to a society's long term needs 
for natural ecosystems, land, and energy.6 Sax notes the effects on the 
disrupted wildlife habitats, the decimated forests, and the few remain-
ing trees and bushes slowly sliding downhill. In many areas, the wa-
ters of the Cumberland Plateau have been turned into acidic drains, fit 
for neither fish nor human. Sax talks about a calculus beyond the 
logic of the marketplace, shaking his head in disbelief that decisions 
can be made to destroy a place so completely when the externalized 
economic impacts are so dramatically negative and feasible alterna-
tives exist. 
4. The best chronicle of this sad process remains the late Harry Caudill's NIGHT 
COMES To THE CUMBERLANDS (1963). Several of the local people who hiked up Red Oak 
with Sax that day had lived up on the mountain until stripping began in the 1950s, when 
whole ridgetop communities had to move down or away. 
5. Before the passage of the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 
(SMCRA), 30 V.S.c.A. § 1201 et seq. (1977), coal sold as high as $75 a ton, with costs in 
some steep-slope, multiple-seam areas, like those Sax was observing, of less than $20 per 
ton. Law enforcement has substantially increased since the mid-1980s, and the price of coal 
has steadily declined. Interview with Benjamin Green, West Virginia Coal Association 
(June 3, 1998) and John Morgan, Kentucky Coal Consultant, (June 6, 1998). 
6. After an outcrop coal seam has been stripped to the high walls (the point at which 
the overhang of an excavated slope is too unstable to be cut further inward), and the seams 
have been auger-drilled sideways further into the hill to salvage as much readily reachable 
coal as possible, the mountain is so unstable that underground mining is impossible, and 
seventy percent of a mountain's coal may be permanently unreachable thereafter, at least 
with today's technology. 
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It is a classic environmental perception: the marketplace will act 
on the logic of its own terms, circumscribed in terms of out of pocket 
costs and benefits directly received. If stripminers do not have to pay 
for the loss of forests and wildlife, for flooding and the disruption of 
mountain communities whose valleys and hills have been turned into 
barren wastelands, that's just the way it is. Standing on that stripmine 
in Tennessee, it is clear that the local coal industry, and the stripmin-
ing regulators with whom the industry works so closely, are not inter-
ested in the comprehensive ecological cost accounting of an 
intergenerational educator. 
C. Sax as Rebbe 
This is not to say that Sax cannot communicate with people in the 
marketplace. Consider the time he was invited to speak to a large 
group of old-line Michigan resource officials. These were state forest 
land managers, traditionally oriented fish and game commissioners 
and state outdoor recreation representatives, most of whom were 
deeply imbued with the ethic of snowmobiles and trail bikes, massive 
hatchery fish stocking, snagging,7 and other commercialized uses of 
the outdoors that bring hundreds of recreationists to the northland 
every weekend. 
Sax talked to them, in what could have come across as a foreign 
language, about how publicly owned forests should be a haven of 
quiet contemplation. There's place enough elsewhere for importing 
the frenzy of the city to the outdoors. The pleasure and experience of 
a hundred quiet recreationists can be disturbed by just one kid blast-
ing through streams and hills on a full throttle trail bike. But Sax 
didn't talk much about user conflicts. Instead, with these guys who 
normally talked about bag limits and local politics, Sax chose to speak 
of Aristotle-specifically, the Aristotelian notion that an individual's 
most rewarding self-investment comes in intensive direct personal in-
tegration with a thoughtful context-and of Ortega y Gasset, the 
Spanish philosopher of individualism who spoke of the enrichment 
that one gets from a quiet sport deeply experienced. 
With this good-ol'-boys crowd, Sax spoke ofthe contrast between 
the economic and political pressures that dominate our daily lives and 
those quiet experiences that can give long term meaning to the life of 
individuals of all social strata and to a society. It worked. Many in 
that audience, having heard about Aristotle and Ortega, left the con-
7. Snagging is a form of fish-catching, still legal in some states, where large treble 
hooks weighted with lead are cast out into pools below dams and falls where migrating fish 
are concentrated and rapidly retrieved. The hooks snag fish in tail, back, belly, throat or 
head. It is not generally regarded as an aesthetic, humane, or sporting method of catching 
fish, but hundreds did it. 
HeinOnline -- 25 Ecology L.Q. 416 1998-1999
416 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25:411 
ference talking about themselves as guardians of a public trust, and 
some of the public lands they managed subsequently shifted away 
from a presumption of open door access to mechanized recreation. 
Sax, perhaps like the rabbi he once studied to be, addresses his 
thoughts to his audience, whomever they are, as if they too hold a 
desire to make sense for the good of all. In his own mind and in his 
public thoughts, it seems that he tries to figure out what the optimal 
long term public interest in a situation may be and expects that the 
merits of such ideas will have force in the minds of those who hear. It 
is a perspective that implicitly expects more of society than the nar-
row, cynical tribalism that too often characterizes daily political and 
economic life. Even a group normally dominated by short term mar-
ket pressures, like those state land managers, can be imbued with a 
sense of legacy and social responsibility because Sax so clearly holds 
himself to the same high inquiry, not attempting to build an empire in 
the tawdry daily world of political expediency. 
D. Sax and Two Economies 
Aristotle, Ortega y Gasset, ecophilosophy, and probing questions 
may have worked on the good-ol' -boys of Michigan's land manage-
ment agencies, but they don't necessarily have much purchase on Jus-
tice Scalia and other devotees of the marketplace. 
In 1993, convinced that Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Commissions imposed an artificially narrow and 
rigid baseline for defining the constitutional takings balance, Sax set 
out an analytical construct of "two economies."9 The balance be-
tween private and public rights, he argued, must take into account the 
realities of natural systems. 
During oral argument in the Lucas case, Justice Scalia sarcasti-
cally derided regulatory programs designed to protect the nation's dis-
appearing wetlands and in his written opinion attempted to build a 
fortress around market based definitions of private property asserting 
that regulations depriving land of its "economic benefit" constitution-
ally require compensation unless the restrictions are those "that back-
ground principles of the state's law of property and nuisance already 
place upon land ownership."l0 Sax, to explain how the realities of 
barrier beach and wetlands ecological systems deserved attention 
8. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
9. Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STANFORD LAW REV. 1433 (1993). The lineage of 
the economy of nature includes Mark Sagoff's book THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHi-
LOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1988), and with a stretch may go as far back as 
Henry David Thoreau's first chapter in WALDEN, called "Economy." 
10. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
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within the constitutional balancing process, counterposited the idea 
that there are two relevant economies, not just one. "There are two 
fundamentally different views of property rights: ... land in the 'trans-
formative [market place] economy;' and land in the 'economy of 
nature."'ll 
11. See generally, Sax, Economy of Nature, supra note 9, at 1442. There, Sax refers to 
"the transformative economy," or what I prefer more simply to label "the marketplace 
economy." Private property rights are primarily defined with reference to the daily reality 
of marketplace ownership, and these property rights have driven what has become the 
greatest economy in the history of the world, powerfully shaping the daily governance of 
our lives and of the nation. 
/ Why use the word "economy"? The concept of a natural "economy" functionally ech-
oes Aldo Leopold's lyrical descriptions of how an ecosystem works and evolves: 
Land, then, is not merely soil; it is a fountain of energy flowing through soils, 
plants, and animals. Food chains are the living channels which conduct energy 
upward; death and decay return to the soil. The circuit is not closed; some energy 
is dissipated in decay, some is added by absorption from the air, some is stored in 
soils, peats, and long-lived forests; but it is a sustained circuit, like a slowly aug-
mented revolving fund of life. 
The velocity and character of the upward flow of energy depend on the complex 
structure of the plant and animal community, much as the upward flow of sap in a 
tree depends on its complex cellular organization. Without this complexity, nor-
mal circulation would presumably not occur. Structure means the characteristic 
numbers, as well as the characteristic kinds and functions, of the component spe-
cies. This interdependence between the complex structure of the land and its 
smooth functioning as an energy unit is one of its basic attributes. 
When a change occurs in one part of the circuit, many other parts must adjust 
themselves to it. Change does not necessarily obstruct or divert the flow of en-
ergy; evolution is a long series of self-induced changes, the net result of which has 
been to elaborate the flow mechanism and to lengthen the circuit. ALDO LEO-
POLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC, 214-220 (1968). 
In today's terms an 'economy' is probably the most appropriate denotative concept to reg-
ister that natural ecosystems deserve recognition as an equally intricate and decisive self-
contained system for managing the inputs and outputs, adaptations and changes, of its 
constituent elements' progression and survival over time. Both 'economy' and 'ecology' 
come from the Greek root oikos, for "home." Garrett Hardin once argued that economics 
should be subordinated as a component of the greater sphere of ecology, rather than vice 
versa. See Garrett Hardin, Sweet-Singing Economists, in EXPLORING NEW ETHICS FOR 
SURVIVAL: THE VOYAGE OF THE SPACESHIP BEAGLE Chap. 9 (Robert Boulting ed. 1972). 
One could therefore reverse fields and relabel the marketplace economy as the "material-
istic ecology," but the phrase does not grab. 
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Sax presented a chart of the two economies as he conceptualized 
them12: 
TRANSFORMATIVE 
[MARKET PLACE] 
ECONOMY 
Tracts are separate. Boundary 
lines are crucial. 
Land is inert/waiting; it is a 
subject of its owner's dominion. 
Land use is governed by private 
will; any tract can be made into 
anything. All land is equal in 
use rights (Black acre is any tract 
anywhere). 
Landowners have no obligations. 
Land has a single 
(transformative) purpose. 
The line between public and 
private is clear. 
ECONOMY OF NATURE 
Connections dominate. 
Ecological services determine 
land units. 
Land is in service; it is part of a 
community where single 
ownership of an ecological 
service unit is rare. 
Land use is governed by 
ecological needs; land has a 
destiny, a role to play. Use 
rights are determined by physical 
nature (wetland, coastal barrier, 
wildlife habitat). 
Landowners have a custodial, 
affirmative protective role for 
ecological functions. 
Land has a dual purpose, both 
transformative and ecological. 
The line between public and 
private is blurred where 
maintenance of ecological 
service is viewed as an owner's 
responsibility. 
"Traditional property law," Sax wrote, "treats undeveloped land 
as essentially inert ... in a passive state, waiting to be put to [direct 
human economic] use. 
Insofar as land is "doing" something-for example, harboring wild an-
imals-property law considers such functions expendable. Indeed, 
getting rid of the natural, or at least domesticating it, was a primary 
task of the European settlers for North America. An ecological view 
of property, the economy of nature, is fundamentally different. Land 
is not a passive entity waiting to be transformed by its land owner. 
Nor is the world comprised of distinct tracts of land, separate pieces 
independent of each other. Rather, an ecological perspective views 
12. Sax, supra, note 9, at 1445. 
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land as consisting of systems defined by their function, not by man-
made boundaries . . . . 
By characterizing the demands of nature as "pressing private property 
into some form of public service," the Lucas Court fails to recognize 
that lands in a state of nature are already in public service, but to a 
purpose that the Court is unwilling to acknowledge. . .. The Court 
should have asked whether notions of property law could be reformu-
lated to accommodate ecological needs without impairing the neces-
sary functions of the transformational economy. 
419 
Sax's analysis focuses on the legal qualities of land in those two 
different economies. A further set of functional ecological distinctions 
between the two economies may be added, as hypothesized indepen-
dently in the work of a remarkable fisheries resources consultant from 
the Pacific Northwest, James Lichatowich. In Lichatowich's terms the 
two economies have these further ecological attributes:13 
THE INDUSTRIAL 
ECONOMY 
Emphasis on production 
Large centralized production 
facilities (economies of scale and 
monocultures) 
Fossil fuel is the primary source 
of energy 
Linear and extractive 
Improvements/changes are 
external (the market's 'invisible 
hand' drives adaptation) 
Independent spheres of 
economic activity (individualism) 
Waste 
THE NATURAL ECONOMY 
Emphasis on reproduction 
Dispersed production (stability 
through diversity) 
Solar radiation is the primary 
source of energy 
Renewable and cyclic 
Improvements/changes are 
internal (genetic diversity drives 
adaptation) 
Interdependent parts 
( con textual) 
No waste, everything is recycled 
Using the concept of two economies as a reminder of the 
concurrent needs of human and natural systems, some participants in 
the highly charged field of fisheries management began to negotiate 
consensus positions. They recognized the necessity for credible, 
enforceable regulatory controls over fisheries harvest quotas, dam and 
13. See James Lichatowich et ai., Oregon Business Council, A New Vision for Pacific 
Salmon, (1996); James Lichatowich, It's the Economies, Mr. President, 34 TROUT, Summer 
1993, at 22-23. Lichatowich uses the phrase "Industrial Economy" for what Sax called the 
"Transformative Economy" and this essay calls the "Marketplace Economy." 
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irrigation operations, and timbercutting impacts on rivers and 
streams.14 
"Two economies" usefully captures the reality of two coexisting 
systems of great complexity and emphasizes that marketplace 
disruptions of the economy of nature cause systemic harms, not just 
irrelevant isolated consequences. The conceptualization, however, 
understandably encounters trouble from devotees of marketplace 
economics, because there is no stated reason why the marketplace 
should feel inclined to accommodate itself to the needs of the 
economy of nature. Market focused thinkers might well accept the 
use of the word "economy" to describe the complex interconnections 
within the economy of nature, but nonetheless resist the relevance of 
the economy of nature to marketplace economics except on the 
latter's own terms. "Although the majority opinion recognizes the 
differences between a transformative economy and an economy of 
nature, it rejects the demands of the economy of nature as legitimate 
obligations of land and of landowners."15 Sax, for instance, points to 
the way the marketplace economy disrupts the delicate ecosystem of 
the economy of nature and asserts that the former should recognize 
the needs of the latter. He words it, however, as if the market should 
do so primarily for the sake of the economy of nature itself 
Lucas' property-coastal dune land-was performing an important 
ecological service to uplands by functioning as a storm and erosion 
barrier. Therefore, maintenance of the land in its natural condition 
might have been ecologically necessary.16 
Thus, a wetland [is] an adjunct of a river, in service to the river as a 
natural resource. Beach dune land would be the frontal region of a 
coastal ecosystem extending far beyond the beach itself. A forest 
would be a habitat for birds and wildlife, rather than simply a discrete 
tract of land containing the commodity timber."17 
Unless the economy of nature can be translated into a logically neces-
sary element within every competent economic analysis, Sax's framing 
of the two economies is likely to be shrugged off by marketplace econ-
omists as one more romantic notion of nature appreciation. 18 That is 
the challenge taken up in the second Part of this essay. 
14. See id. 
15. Sax, Economy of Nature, supra note 9, at 1446. 
16. Id. at 1445 (emphasis added). Sax continues, "In an economy of nature the land-
owner's role is perforce custodial at the outset." 
17. Id. (emphasis added). 
18. Mr. Lichatowich, a respected consultant on fisheries management policy based in 
Sequim, Washington, however, reports that some industrial interests in the Pacific North-
west have given the "natural economy" analysis a surprisingly responsive reception, en-
couraging more cooperative approaches to regulatory data gathering and restrictions on 
activities that directly and indirectly impact natural resource systems. After a presentation 
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E. Sax and Endangered Species: Mentor to Snail Darters 
Paradoxically, it is endangered species law that suggests a 
broader context linking the two economies. Sax has published very 
little about endangered species or the public trust of wildlife endan-
germent. But his ecophilosophical and legal process ideas were funda-
mental to the classic endangered species case of the 1970s, Tennessee 
Valley Authority v. Hill, which has long been characterized as the ex-
treme confrontation between practical economics and the abstractions 
of environmental protection.19 
The story of the contest between the endangered Snail Darter, 
and Tellico, Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) last dam project, has 
been chronicled elsewhere.2° In short, the Tellico Dam case was a 
classic faceoff under the Endangered Species Act (ESA)21 between a 
public-works porkbarrel project and modern principles of environ-
mental and social economic accounting. The TVA was pushing inexo-
rably to build its last dam on the region's last remaining major stretch 
at a business council forum, for example, one observer noted "If you had told me you'd 
walk out of here with a resolution cautioning against increased industrialization, I'd have 
said you're crazy." Businessmen who had resisted comprehensive environmental resource 
regulations said to him that "Now 1 finally understand what this is all about." Telephone 
interview with James Lichatowich, (Dec. 15, 1997). 
19. Many environmentalists miss this utilitarian justification of endangered species 
protections, falling back upon spiritual and ethical principles alone to justify the supposed 
"extremism" of the Snail Darter case: 
One day in early June, Bobby Kennedy Jr. stands over the body of a decomposing 
fox, killed by one of his homemade traps that had been set after the rabid crea-
ture had menaced his children at his home in Mount Kisco, N.Y. Nature is his 
faith, and he recounts a conversation he'd had with a Catholic priest on a moun-
tain top. "I kind of challenged him with the most difficult episode in the history 
of environmental advocacy, which was the snail darter case. 1 said, 'How did we 
allow this 2-inch fish with no economic significance to hold up a $ 1 billion dam 
project that would have provided energy and jobs to people? Why did we put fish 
before people?' And he said, 'That's not what happened. We know at our core, 
as Americans, that if we lose a single species, we lost part of our ability to sense 
the Divine, to understand who God is and therefore what our potential is, as 
human beings.' Then 1 understood that God reveals himself through many ave-
nues. When we destroy those things, whether whole species or huge ecosystems, 
to me, it's the moral equivalent of tearing the last pages out of the last Bible on 
Earth." 
John Marks, Special Report: The Return of the Kennedys, Struggling Against Conservatives 
and Cynics, A New Generation of Activists Tries to Assert Itself, U.S. News & World Re-
port, Sept. 2, 1996, at 42. 
20. See, e.g., W.B. WHEELER AND M.J. McDONALD, TV A AND THE TELLICO DAM 
1936-1979184 (1986); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Reflected in a River: Agency Accountability and 
the TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN L. REV. 747, 764-776 (1982); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In 
the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigm and its Consequences, 19 U. 
MICH. J.L. REV. 805 (1986); ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY: NATURE LAW AND SOCIETY 672-86 (1998). 
21. 16 U.S.c.A. § 1531 et seq. (1973, as amended). 
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of free flowing big river,22 despite overwhelming economic and eco-
logical arguments against it.23 Given TVA's internal momentum and 
regional power, there was no official forum, agency, or statute that 
would force the project to stand or fall on its objective merits. 
The Little Tennessee River would have disappeared in 1973 had it 
not been for Hiram Hill, a law student of mine who needed a term 
paper topic. Earlier, while on an unplanned leave of absence from 
law school, he had joined a fish biology fieldwork class which discov-
ered a small endangered perch in the middle of the Tellico Dam area, 
a fragile little fish that required clear, cool, flowing river conditions in 
order to survive. "This dam looks as if it may violate § 7 of the En-
dangered Species Act," he said. "Do you think that's enough for a 
twelve-page term paper?" I thought it was. The ESA's § 7 prohibits 
federal agencies from jeopardizing the continued existence of endan-
gered species or modifying their critical habitat,24 and the dam appar-
ently did both. Three citizens, including Hill and me, in a bruising 
odyssey that got me fired, persuaded the Department of Interior to 
list the Snail Darter as endangered, drafted a complaint against the 
TVA, and went to court. 
In preparing the litigation, we drew deeply upon what we had 
learned from Joe Sax, in legal process terms as well as ecophilosophy. 
And when Sax was asked for advice on whether the bombshell should 
be filed he tersely replied, "Sounds like a good idea to me." He was in 
the minority. 
Why should we protect this, or any, endangered species? This, of 
course, was the question brought into national debate when the Tel-
22. By 1973, TVA had impounded 2,500 linear miles of the Tennessee and Kentucky 
River systems, leaving the Little Ts thirty three miles as the last remaining stretch of un-
dammed river. 
23. Charles Schultze was the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors and a 
member of the Cabinet level endangered species committee created by the 1987 ESA 
Amendments. 16 V.S.c.A. § 1536(e) - (0) (often referred to as the "God Committee," and 
more recently the "God Squad," because of its power to authorize extinctions). At the 
conclusion of the economic analysis at the Committee's Tellico hearing, he pointedly noted 
that even with 95% of the allocated money spent, the benefits of Tellico did not justify 
spending the last 5%, "which says something about the original design." U.S. Dep't of the 
Interior, Endangered Species Committee Hearing 26 (Jan. 23, 1979) (unpublished transcript 
of public hearing, available at Tellico Archives, Boston College Law School). Committee 
Chairman Cecil Andrus said, "I hate to see the Snail Darter get the credit for stopping a 
project that was ill conceived and uneconomic in the first place." And in a penetrating 
study of the TVA archives, even after those archives had been vetted by TVA's legal de-
partment, the internal institutional momentum was evident: the Tellico Dam project was an 
extremely important opportunity to show that the agency could push forward with major 
projects that were not justified by traditional agency economic justifications. See 
WHEELER AND McDoNALD, supra note 20 at 3-6. 
24. See 16 VSCA § 1536(a)(2). 
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lico Dam filing produced a Sixth Circuit injunction.25 Sax's public 
trust concepts offered a somewhat helpful analogy, affirming the leg-
acy of nature received from past generations, which should insofar as 
possible be passed on as legacy to future generations. There is, argua-
bly, a moral and philosophical imperative, a sort of human noblesse 
oblige, to steward our planet and the creatures that inhabit it, harming 
them as little as possible. 
But these rarefied moral and ethical abstractions, ranging from 
Taoist concepts of humans as part of nature to Judeo-Christian con-
cepts of stewardship like Noah's Ark, do not resonate much with 
pork barrel agencies, octagenarian chairmen of appropriations com-
mittees, or judges. 
In pragmatic terms it is far more effective to argue, if one can, 
that endangered species protection has direct human utility. The rea-
son that the ESA, almost alone in the parade of statutes from the 
1970s, has still not achieved acceptance in the political marketplace 
and regularly faces attempts to repeal it in all but name, is that the 
human usefulness of protecting endangered species is far less tangible 
than the direct protections of health and property implicit in virtually 
all other major federal environmental statutes.26 
Proponents of endangered species protection regularly try to 
sound a utilitarian argument for protecting endangered species. In 
some cases, they claim that the species itself is directly physically im-
portant to human health and welfare. For instance, the Pacific Yew, 
an endangered plant on the California coastline, turns out to contain 
taxol, a chemical that· is extremely useful in treating certain forms of 
cancer.27 We should therefore protect all endangered species because 
they are like books that we have not yet learned to read; the lessons 
they have for us may be critically important, but if we lose the book, 
the information is lost forever. 
In far more cases, however, endangered species have no direct 
physical use, but may have great human utility as functional indicators 
or barometers of human welfare. The major cause of species endan-
germent is destruction and modification of habitat, and often this im-
25. See Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977). (The suit was filed by Hill, the 
author, and Donald Cohen, and was later joined by the Association of Southeastern Biolo-
gists and the local chapter of the Audubon Society.) 
26. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Embattled Social Utilities of the Endangered Species 
Act - A Noah Presumption and Caution Against Putting Gas Masks on Canaries. 27 ENVfL 
LAW 845, 848-851 (1997). 
27. I particularly like the example given by Dr. Mark Imlay, a malachologist who 
reported that when he was testifying at a House hearing on the ESA, one of the stolid, 
uninterested members of the committee sat up and started taking an avid interest in the 
ESA when it was mentioned that a substance derived from an endangered shellfish off Key 
West showed promise in curing genital herpes. Conversation with Dr. Mark Imlay, 
Malacologist, (Apr. 1976). 
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pact is detrimental to humans as well. When the Brown Pelican was 
threatened because pesticides interfered with its reproductive mecha-
nisms, it was a warning for human health as well. Today, when frogs 
and raptors show the signs of excessive chemical exposures in the 
Great Lakes region, it is likewise a warning for human health and 
welfare. 
Endangered species have a marked utility beyond direct physical 
uses. They act as "canaries in the coal mine." When the sensitive 
little birds carried into coal mines of old began to show the effects of 
invisible and odorless methane gas buildups, the miners' health and 
safety were imminently threatened. 
In the Tellico Dam setting, the Snail Darter's canary-in-the-coal-
mine function operated beyond health and safety; the Darter, like the 
Spotted Owl and its other endangered colleagues, was a barometer of 
major economic and ecological human social interests in its environ-
ment.28 The Darter's last substantial population, found only in the 
last thirty-three undammed miles of the Tennessee River system, ac-
ted as both a vivid ecological indicator and a legal tripwire providing 
an otherwise nonexistent opportunity to survey and weigh the con-
tending merits of the project in light of all the real public interests 
involved. 
F. Sax and Legal Process: Pluralism and the Strategic Role of 
Citizen Litigation 
The Tennessee endangered species litigation built upon another 
Saxian theory. Over the preceding years, Sax had repeatedly noted 
the strategic importance of active citizen enforcement of environ men-
tal laws, particularly in courtroom litigation. In the Tellico Dam set-
ting, as in so many cases, it was clear that the official environmental 
agencies were unable or unwilling to enforce the statute against a po-
tent defendant. ESA § 11, however, like so many federal environ-
mental statutes, gives citizen environmentalists a right to file 
enforcement actions against statutory violations,29 thereby, Sax ar-
28. The Spotted Owl, for instance, is an indicator of the long distance, cumulative, 
and dysfunctional consequences of subalpine clearcutting, which has caused flooding, mud-
slides and a crash in the commercial salmon fishery of Pacific Northwest, supported by 
billions of dollars of public subsidies. See, PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY, 686-91. 
29. Section 1540(g)(1) of the ESA, a typical citizen enforcement provision, provides: 
... any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf-
(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmen-
tal instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment 
to the Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this 
chapter or regulation issued under the authority thereof; or 
B) to compel the Secretary to apply, pursuant to section 1535(g)(2)(B)(ii) of this 
title, the prohibitions set forth in or authorized pursuant to section 1533(d) or 
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gued, also providing legal process leverage to force the merits of the 
project into a public forum. Sax's book Defending the Environment, 
published in 1970,30 is a milestone in a period of dramatic change in 
the American system of governance from a bipolar to a multicentric 
pluralistic modeJ.31 Beginning in the 1960s, American citizen activists 
instigated a shift within the legal system toward multi-polar, multi-
centric initiatives bringing a plethora of different voices into daily gov-
ernance, adding practical force to efforts to make agencies and the 
marketplace obey the laws.32 Professor Michael Axline, whose trea-
tise provides an excellent study of the role and techniques of citizen 
litigation,33 has repeatedly acknowledged Sax's pioneering role in 
charting out this quintessentially American legal process innovation. 
The importance of citizen enforcement is echoed today in the suc-
cesses of many major federal statutes which never would have devel-
oped into credible regulatory systems without the citizen litigation Sax 
so energetically encouraged.34 
In the Tellico case, the citizen litigation initiative that won stand-
ing in the courts and forced an accounting on the merits was a Saxist 
effort, and, since the facts showed a violation of the ESA, the courts 
had little choice but to enforce the law. As the citizens' brief, quoting 
Sax, reminded the Court, the job of the Court is not to take on the 
political balancing of such conflicts, but to enforce the law, which then 
in practical effect would result in a "remand to the legislature."35 The 
1538(a)(I)(B) of this title with respect to the taking of any resident endangered 
species or threatened species within any State; or 
(C) against the Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the Secretary to per-
form any act or duty under section 1533 of this title which is not discretionary 
with the Secretary. 
Sax wrote the famous Michigan citizen suit statute. M.C.L.A. §§691.1201-1207 (1970), com-
monly called the "Sax Act" or "MEPA," which provides standing to bring a new cause of 
action for protection of the environment and the public trust, and has spawned similar laws 
in more than half a dozen other states. 
30. JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1970). 
31. In a bipolar system, government agencies are entrusted with the role of countering 
and regulating market failures and excesses. See PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND POLICY, supra note 28, at 31, n.26. But the bipolar system is often subject to overload 
or to the blandishments of the capture phenomenon. On the phenomenon of agency cap-
ture, see Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1669, 1684-87 (1975). 
32. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, A Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 Loy. 
L.A. L. REV. 981, 1001 (1994). 
33. MICHAEL D. AxLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS. 
34. The National Environment Policy Act (NEPA), which requires that before taking 
major actions one should carefully analyze the possibility that they may result in substan-
tial externalities and net losses, has in effect been enforced only by citizens. Nevertheless, 
NEPA's fundamental societal importance is indicated by the fact that state governments 
and international institutions have come to applaud its basic logic. 
35. Brief for respondents at 44, TVA v. Hill, 437 US 153 (1978). In a legislative re-
mand, " ... the role of the courts is not to make public policy, but to help assure that public 
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Supreme Court bought that argument,36 and the controversy moved 
to Congress where the project finally received its first public scrutiny 
on the merits.37 
G. Sax and Endangered Species: A Rebbe's Foray into the Thickets 
of the Political Marketplace 
The pork barrel forces of the marketplace ultimately over-
whelmed the little Snail Darter, in a noisy process of caricature and 
trivialization. The press never managed to deconstruct the public 
works lobby's merchandising of the classic false tradeoff, that here 
was another case where environmental protection had to be traded for 
economic progress, and a surreptitious appropriations rider overrode 
the injunction.38 
The brouhaha over the Snail Darter and alleged environmental 
extremism has continued in generalized attacks upon the ESA as a 
whole. The politics of endangered species protection has crescendoed 
into a volatile pitched battle, as a variety of industries, particularly 
ranching, timber, mining, and real estate development,39 recognized 
the constraints and the awkward revelations that can follow from the 
policy is made by the appropriate entity." SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT, supra 
note 30, at 149. 
36. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). When I travelled to Japan in 1980 to consult 
on a public interest campaign to save Lake Biwa (which also had involved a sensitive little 
endangered fish, the Biwa Royal Aiyu) from rampant industrial development, Sax had 
been there before me. "Ah!" the lake's citizen defenders said, "Professor Sax! He came 
here! He spoke to us of Institutionalized Caution!" Sax had harvested this phrase from the 
TVA v. Hill majority opinion's justification for protecting species whose utility may not be 
known. 
37. Congress refused to overide the injunction after three sets of hearings in the 
House and Senate committees with ESA jurisdiction. Thereafter the Cabinet-level review 
by the Endangered Species Committee, supra note 23, revealed the shaky economic merits 
of the dam project and the value of the river for darter and public alike. Nevertheless, a 
legislative override came later, in a late night manoeuvre accomplished by the House's 
pork barrel Appropriations Committee. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail 
Darter: an Environmental Paradigm and Its Consequences, 19 J. LAW REFORM 805, 824 
(1986). 
38. See id. The course of the Tellico Dam project after the Supreme Court injunction 
was initially heartening, with the unanimous God Squad decision on economic as well as 
ecological grounds in favor of the darter and preservation of the river habitat, and the 
three congressional hearings likewise undercutting the project's economics and supporting 
application of the ESA. But project supporters were able to capitalize on the media's 
continued image of a small species 
stopping progress and ultimately overrode the citizens' eight years of work with a 42-sec-
ond floor vote on an appropriations rider. President Carter's fear of press caricatures led 
him to sign the override with pilatian sadness. See MARK REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: 
THE AMERCIAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 324-30 (1993). The river died a 
year later. Several small remnant populations of the fish have subsequently been found, 
and it is now listed as only a threatened species. 
39. These industries have funded a national strike force, NESARC, the National En-
dangered Species Act Reform Coalition, to roll back the Act's protections. 
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ESA's canary-in-the-coal-mine indicator function. In Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, Justice Scalia clearly was 
gunning for the ESA (especially ESA § 9 limits on private property 
developments which "take" or harm endangered species or their habi-
tats), as well as coastal barrier beach and wetlands regulations. Under 
pressure from Wise Use industrial lobbying,40 the ESA has had its 
appropriations savagely cut, suffered a year long moratorium on its 
listing enforcement, lingered for six years without re-authorization, 
and in general been on a drastic defensive over the past decade and 
more. 
Into this melee walked Joe Sax, on a two year leave from the halls 
of academe as Special Assistant and resident legal philosopher to Sec-
retary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt. At Interior, Sax took on a 
number of different projects. One hallmark assignment was to negoti-
ate intellectual and bureaucratic compromises between the protection 
of endangered species under ESA § 9 and the phalanx of private 
property and corporate interests threatened by such protections. 
From this work came a much elaborated program of Habitat Conser-
vation Plans (HCPs) under ESA § 10, allowing negotiated permits for 
"incidental taking" of endangered species so that private and corpo-
rate development projects can continue if they incorporate required 
mitigations.41 
Sax, the legal philosopher of private and public rights, must have 
felt himself transported into a bewilderingly uncongenial new ecosys-
tem.42 Within the Beltway, Sax's work could not be shaped only by the 
public's long-term best interests. Instead he had to ride the volatile 
politics of endangered species protection where Congressional majori-
ties were thought capable of gutting the entire ESA in the blink of an 
eye, backed by a chorus of Limbaughian invective characterizing spe-
cies protections as foolish and destructive elitist whims.43 
40. The so called "Wise Use" movement is a quasi-populist political initiative exten-
sively funded by resource user industries to undercut state and federal regulation. See 
PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 20, at 83-84. 
41. See Symposium on HCPs, 27 ENVTL LAW 755 (1997). 
42. Sax's regulatory takings articles were theoretical defenses of constitutional posi-
tions, incorporating concepts of public trust and "spillovers," which provided support 
against private and corporate attacks upon government regulations. Bureaucratic and leg-
islative maneuvering constitute a completely different world. 
43. "The militant environmentalist movement in America today is a new homosocial-
ism, communism. What these people are [doing] is ... trying to attack capitalism and 
corporate America in the form of going after timber companies. And they're trying to say 
that we must preserve these virgin trees because the Spotted Owl and The Rat Kangaroo 
and whatever live in them, and it's the only place they can live, the Snail Darter and 
whatever ... " Rush Limbaugh, remarks on Rush Limbaugh radio show (December 7, 
1993) (transcript available in Lexis, News Library, Script File.) 
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To negotiate a modicum of political defense against the focused 
attacks of the Wise Use industry coalitions, Sax helped refine a pro-
gram of "no surprises" and "safe harbor" agreements, a program he 
briefly noted in a recent article.44 A development project, after fund-
ing biological assessments and planning for species conservation miti-
gation, can get a green light to alter habitats. These Hep regulatory 
compromises are undeniably risky.45 For an intergenerational educa-
tor the process must have conveyed the sour taste of short term prag-
matic political expediency. Sax has noted, however, that under the 
pressure of the anti-endangered species industrial forces, the Clinton 
and prior administrations were almost not enforcing ESA § 9 at all. 
"Anyone who tells you that there is no risk in this Hep process 
doesn't know what they're talking about, but the risks are worth 
taking. "46 
To some observers it appears that tendencies to moderate the 
ESA, in part through expedited incidental take provisions, are a sad 
retreat from Sax's principles of legal process pluralism (for example, 
in restricting the practical ability of citizens to enforce Heps and stat-
utory norms) and from his ideas of societal legacy (especially when 
the merits of so many development projects do not justify erosion of 
species protections). The threats to the ESA are real, however, and 
the public relations onslaught continues to roll on using shallow car-
icatures of endangered species as whimsical obstacles to solid eco-
nomic projects. One suspects that Sax breathed a great sigh of relief 
upon returning to the classroom, where the long term public merits of 
an issue playa significant role in its discussion and resolution. 
44. Sax, supra note 1, at 12-14 
45. A few HCPs support Sax's hopes for thoughtful mediation between public and 
private interests and have won admiring praise from biologists and environmental analysts. 
Many HCPs negotiated to date, however, appear to be preemptive capitulations to market 
political pressures. See PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 20, 
at 705-08. Such political compromises, as in the HCP for the Red-cockaded Woodpecker 
in privately owned forests of the Southeast, or a current Alabama barrier beach condo 
project, often override the ESA's indicator function. The ESA needs a more thoughtful 
press in, the marketplace of ideas and political debate if HCPs are to be more than political 
capitualtions. 
46. Personal correspondence with Joe Sax (January 8,1998). Sax further noted, "[tJhe 
ESA would be a great study of what really happens when you enforce a law evolving over 
time. It will be years before we know whether the compromise we've drafted has worked." 
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II. 
THE THREE ECONOMIES 
How can we achieve an integration of important societal concerns 
that lie beyond the marketplace, including the intricacies of nature, 
into the processes of daily life and civic governance? Attempting to 
do so, Professor Sax and others have spoken of "two economies," the 
economy of nature existing concurrently with the human marketplace 
economy. They have provided no compelling explanation to skeptics 
like Justice Scalia, however, for why human economics must acknowl-
edge nature's economics.47 
Discerning the existence of two economies is helpful, but in order 
to construct a complete and comprehensive schematic structure of 
economic systems, it seems important to hypothesize one additional 
"economy." There is an important sphere of societal economic reality 
that exists in terms extending beyond nature and the marketplace. 
When we talk about the problem of environmental social cost exter-
nalizations, and other positive and negative public values beyond mar-
ketplace economics, aren't we really identifying a third economy, an 
overarching civic economics that incorporates the cumulative interests 
of society as they exist beyond the terms of the marketplace? 
I propose that, analytically, we should talk in terms of three econ-
omies: a marketplace economy, an economy of nature, and a civic-
societal economy.48 
The marketplace economy is the well known mechanism of every-
day economic and political behavior. It sits in the middle, dynamically 
churning out power, interlocking networks of motivations and institu-
tions, property rights, goods, politics, and wastes. It dominates the 
daily life of most of human society. 
The natural economy, as noted by Sax and others, is the intricate 
complex of living, geophysical systems that sustains dynamic planetary 
processes. It partly overlaps the two human economies-the human 
civic-societal economy, and the human marketplace economy-sup-
plying vital resources and services to both, but in part lies outside 
them. The economy of nature processes everything, adapts to every-
thing (though often with altered and diminished qualities of ecosystem 
health and diversity), absorbs wastes and other externalities from the 
marketplace, and passes the effects of many of these externality im-
pacts onward to the civic economy. 
47. See supra Part I.D. 
48. As with the "marketplace economy," the phrase "civic-societal economy" could 
be denoted by various other smoother phrases. "Public economy," however, already has a 
different connotation to economists. Just saying "civic" economy implies too little, while 
"societal" economy is too amorphous. So for the time being, it remains here unmelodi-
ously as the "civic-societal" economy. 
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The civic-societal economy contains the dynamic processes of the 
marketplace within its realm, but its terms and elements also extend 
much further beyond just those things that can be bought and sold. 
Externalized costs, for instance, go forth from marketplace actors and 
accumulate somewhere, even if they are invisible to the marketplace, 
and they have important consequences. 
Costs externalized by marketplace enterprises, by factories, 
porkbarrel government agency projects and programs, or undertak-
ings combining private and public entrepreneurs, exit the marketplace 
economy but do not thereby drop into oblivion. Instead, they are in-
ternalized into one or both of the other economies, into the fabric of 
the natural and societal economics in which we will continue to live. 
The civic-societal economy comprises the total reality of resources, 
energy, inputs, outputs, values, qualities and consequences that carries 
the life and welfare of a human society from day to day and into the 
future, whether the marketplace acknowledges them or not. 
The theoretical importance of a comprehensive accounting for 
externalized costs49 has long been acknowledged by academic econo-
mists, but is overlooked in the day to day economic and political pres-
sures of the marketplace. Economic analyses that ignore civic-societal 
economics, or natural economics that impinge on the civic sphere, 
however, are naively or disingenuously narrow, failing to account for 
substantial realities that inevitably will be felt by the society. The 
three economies offer a vehicle to force this economic and legal 
accounting. 
If one were to do a schematic rendering of the three economies, 
showing their separateness but fundamental interrelatedness, it might 
look something like this: 
49. Since the dawn of environmental law, it has been evident that most environmental 
problems derive from human and societal actions driven by the dynamic, logical calculus of 
marketplace economics. Human nature and the corporate processes that reflect it reso-
lutely focus upon internalizing benefits and externalizing costs. The result is that a vast 
array of real social costs, like the totality of the effects of stripmining, are diffused into the 
public and natural commons. Only with great difficulty, and against the strenuous and 
powerful resistance of marketplace politics, can the governance process acknowledge and 
account for environmental costs and other nonmarket civic concerns. 
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THE THREE ECONOMIES 
Relative size and scale vary 
with observer's perspective. 
431 
Charting out the three economies provides a structure for analyz-
ing the interrelatedness and interdependence that lie at the heart of 
modern science and policy analysis.50 If natural economic and public 
values can be forced into marketplace economic processes, they are 
much more likely to be efficiently implemented. If civic and natural 
economics are acknowledged, marketplace economics will not be the 
preclusive standard of regulatory validity and other legal tests. 
In the scheme of the three economies, environmental statutes, 
like most "public interest" laws, are designed to operate within the 
larger perimeter of the civic-societal economy, correcting the short-
comings of the marketplace. In reality, however, the regulatory agen-
cies spend most if not all of their daily political lives within and 
dominated by the pressures and constraints of marketplace politics. 
Public interest organizations, most of them, are oriented primarily to-
50. Interdependence could mean the three are both receptors and contributors, but at 
least in the case of the natural economy, the interdependence tends to be one-way. The 
natural economy is predominantly a contributor of resources to the market economy, and a 
receptor of negative externalities. While marketplace and human societal economics often 
depend on the resources and life support supplied by the natural economy, natural systems 
generally would continue to thrive without a single human being on the planet. Adapta-
tion and change are the essence of natural systems, and so long as the sun shines and the 
water cycle flows the natural systems would maintain an evolving biodiversity without 
humans. Exceptions where nature has some dependency on humans might include the 
limited instances where a particular species is given a respite from human disruptions by 
attentive biologists or endangered species law, or where a habitat is created or protected 
by human interventions. 
HeinOnline -- 25 Ecology L.Q. 432 1998-1999
432 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25:411 
ward civic-societal interests,51 but nevertheless spend most of their 
time attempting to counterweigh the dominant pressures of the mar-
ketplace. Scratch an environmental law controversy anywhere in the 
world and you are likely to find a natural value or a public value being 
destructively disregarded by the market's political and entrepreneurial 
forces. 
Environmental law, if properly administered, directs itself toward 
all three economies. Its instrumental focus is almost always upon the 
marketplace economy, attempting to integrate appropriate external 
constraints and values into the marketplace in three separate settings: 
a. Where marketplace externalities directly impact upon human 
welfare in the civic-societal economy, without reference to the 
economy of nature, as in direct human toxic exposures, urban 
transit, historic preservation, and the like; 
b. Where marketplace externalities impinge upon natural sys-
tems so as to cause consequential harms to human welfare in the 
civic-societal economy, as with global warming, Forest Service 
c1earcutting sales, and toxic discharges into the Nation's waters; 
and 
c. Where environmental laws target marketplace externalities 
purely in terms of protecting the economy of nature itself, where 
there are few or no material consequences upon human welfare, 
as in those cases of endangered species protection where no sub-
stantial human utility is served, humane treatment cases, ecologi-
cal preservation for moral, religious, aesthetic, or intellectual 
purposes, and the like. 
The first two settings are by far the most frequent in environmen-
tal law, as market externalizations impact human welfare either di-
rectly or, as so often, disrupt the economy of nature causing 
consequential harms within the civic-societal economy. This logical 
connection between natural systems and societal interests provides 
the compelling utilitarian linkage that should force hardnosed eco-
51. Most citizen public interest groups, of course, must find ways of surviving beyond 
pure volunteer efforts and sometimes make very successful accommodations with fundrais-
ing and other practical organizational needs. Some self-styled "public interest" groups, on 
the other hand, like the array of "public interest law foundations" and Wise Use populist 
organizations, are in reality created and funded by marketplace enterprises to counteract 
the civic momentum of citizens groups. See Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 
YALE L.J. 1415 (1984), (noting how the Pacific Legal Foundation and its progeny consist-
ently operate as tax deductible fronts promoting industry positions against environmental 
and other civic constraints); MACWILLIAMS COSGROVE SNIDER, THE WISE USE MOVE-
MENT: STRATEGIC ANALYSIS & FiFTY STATE REVIEW (1993); MONTANA AFLICIO, COR· 
PORATIONS FUND "PEOPLE FOR THE WEST" (1993). 
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nomics based legal and policy analyses to integrate environmental 
considerations, which Scalia sought so strenuously to avoid in Lucas. 
In positive terms, the civic-societal economy receives the values 
and benefits that humans derive from natural systems, like the multi 
trillion dollar "natural capital" values that some resource economists 
say we annually receive "free" from nature, values unacknowledged 
by the marketplace economy.52 The civic-societal economy also ab-
sorbs negatives from the economy of nature's disruptions from market 
economy impacts. Some marketplace externalities may only affect 
natural systems, with no human consequences, but many others pass 
through the environment into the human welfare context of civic-soci-
etal economics. Toxic spills into watercourses, global warming, lost 
fisheries, eroded soils, wetlands destruction, pesticide loading, and a 
host of other environmental issues demonstrate important linkages 
between all three economies.53 
The analytical construct of three economies provides a potentially 
useful matrix for discussion of many issues of environmental law and 
policy, and beyond, which this essay can only begin to suggest. Here, 
leading off with issues noted in the first part of the essay, are a few 
policy applications that illustrate how the three economies can be ana-
lytically useful. Most of these applications have legal utility as well, 
(that is, the construct is helpful in legislative, administrative, and in-
dustrial policy arenas, and often in shaping legal arguments). 
• The value of wilderness: The Reagan Administration Secretary 
of the Interior, James Watt, once famously said, "Are you just 
going to look at it, or are you going to use it?" The marketplace 
finds little value in wilderness designations, but the values of wil-
derness in terms of natural "islands" of genetic reservoirs and 
ecosystem preservation are scientifically tangible, and in societal 
terms constitute unique resources for scientific and human exper-
iences, as well as utilitarian storehouses, representing opportunity 
costs that are incalculably large. As with the "Aristotelian" values 
of quiet contemplation identified by Sax, wildernesses too can ac-
cordingly be recognized as assets of societal enhancement. 
• Restoration of lands beyond their market value: As with moun-
tain stripmines, an identification of the extensive consequences of 
cut-and-run stripmining (to natural ecosystems, water tables, low 
52. See infra note 56. 
53. Sax implied these strategic linkages of the natural economy to human utility. 
"Land [in a natural state] is already at work performing important services .. " For exam-
ple, forests regulate the global climate, marshes sustain marine fisheries, and prairie grass 
holds the soil in place." Sax, Economy of Nature, supra note 9, at 1442, 1445. Each of 
these examples conveys direct human utilities, as well as the natural consequences Sax is 
chronicling. 
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income communities, and to potential future social needs for land 
and energy) reveals the dominant tendency of market decisions 
as dangerously narrowed and potentially socially dysfunctional. 
• Balancing private versus public rights: As Sax argued after Lu-
cas, in weighing the validity of land use restrictions like wetlands 
regulation, the natural economy constitutes an important system 
to be factored into the definition of contending rights in the regu-
lation of private activities. By adding the third economy, the im-
plicit balance in regulatory takings cases is clarified to require 
consideration of effects upon the civic-societal needs and public 
harms, and that will often incorporate consideration of the effects 
of disruptions of the natural economy. 
• Benefit-cost assessment process: No development project or 
program can be rationally evaluated in a vacuum. With public 
works projects like TVA's Tellico Darn, program assessment re-
quires comprehensive accounting of nonmarket civic costs and 
benefits over time.54 On the other hand, some of the same mar-
ketplace players who oppose benefit-cost reviews of porkbarrel 
projects rigorously support a form of benefit-cost analysis as a 
restriction on public interest regulations. Recent bills in Con-
gress have sought to impose strict market oriented benefit-cost 
tests on agency rules, an initiative that even many economists 
think infeasible.55 
• Civic terms of reference for the administrative process: Too 
often agencies, not to mention legislators and judges, are con-
strained into short-term decisionmaking and evasion of civic 
mandates by the power and suasions of marketplace politics. The 
commensal relationships of the u.S. Forest Service and the Bu-
reau of Land Management with the timber, livestock, and mining 
industries, for instance, reflect the eclipsing of the natural and 
societal economies by the power and blandishments of the mar-
ketplace economy_ The hope is that a civic appreciation of the 
three economies, and public presentations invoking the broader 
54. See SCHULTZE & GRAMLICH, A GUIDE To BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 134-48 (2nd 
ed. 1990). The Tellico project is only one of many examples of the need to expand analysis 
beyond economic projections that often come from project promoters in the marketplace. 
55. A group of economists has recently developed a set of principles for using and 
improving benefit-cost analysiS in rulemaking, pointing out that congressional leaders need 
a better understanding of the uses and limits of benefit-cost analysis. "Republican propo-
nents of using benefit-cost analysis have failed to state how imprecise the analysis can be in 
certain applications. . . . Democrats in Congress, on the other hand, need to learn that 
benefit-cost analysis is a tool that should be taken more seriously than it has been." Econ-
omists Release Principles For Use Of Benefit-Cost Analysis In Rule-Making, BNA NED 
(Jan. 29, 1996). 
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economic realities they represent, can introduce concepts of long 
term public interest into daily political behavior. 
• "How safe is safe?": Risk assessment is likewise a rational pro-
cess susceptible to reductionism: "Will this cause cancer"? The 
three economies can operate as a reminder that risk assessment 
must internalize indirect consequences to natural systems and 
civic economics beyond simple numbers of individual cases of 
illness. 
• "Natural Capital" in operative terms: A significant new initia-
tive in environmental policy analysis and resource economics is 
the attempt to estimate the value of "Natural Capital," the value 
to human economics (both marketplace and civic) of the services 
supplied by natural systems. The value to humans of Natural 
Capital has been estimated at $16 to 54 trillion per year.56 
Threats to this fund can obviously pose drastic disruptions of 
human welfare. How can their importance be imposed upon the 
political marketplace, however, given that most natural services 
are provided free? The rubric of three economies can emphasize 
an economic imperative to do so. 
• The limits of the marketplace: Law-and-economics adherents 
have developed a devotion to complex propositions of the superi-
ority and omnicompetence of market mechanisms in societal or-
dering. In their world of marketplace dominance, the role of 
environmental policy is reduced to the goal of achieving effi-
ciency in assuring that "resources [are] being used so as to maxi-
mize human satisfactions. "57 The three economies can remind 
law-and-economics scholars that market-externalized social costs 
are internalized into the two other economies where they have 
very real consequences. Yet those economies lack the internal 
accounting, brokering, and self defense mechanisms of the mar-
ketplace economy. Human satisfactions reflected in marketplace 
56. Robert Costanza and Herman Daly have led the Natural Capital analysis and 
come up with impressive numbers: 
We have estimated the current economic value of 17 ecosystem services for 16 
biomes, based on published studies and a few original calculations. For the entire 
biosphere, the value (most of which is outside the market) is estimated to be in 
the range of US $16-54 trillion per year. ... Because of the nature of the uncer-
tainties, this must be considered a minimum estimate. Global gross national 
product total is around $18 trillion per year. 
Robert Costanza et aI., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services, 387 NATURE 253 
(1997). See also Robert Costanza & Herman Daly, Natural Capital and Sustainable Devel-
opment, 6 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 37-46 (1992); PAUL HAWKEN, ET AL., NATURAL CAPI· 
TALlSM: THE COMING EFFICIENCY REVOLUTION (1998); and Paul Hawken, Natural 
Capitalism, Mother Jones Mar.lApril 1997 at 40. 
57. See, e.g., WILLIAM BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS? THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POL· 
LUTION 17 (1974). 
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terms may not be the most accurate gauge of societal needs. Nat-
ural systems and environmental quality have extraordinarily sig-
nificant long term and indirect human importance that a truly 
"conservative" approach to human governance, concerned with 
societal survival, ignores at its peril. 
• Resource depletion taxes, increased prices for public resources 
like timber and minerals, carbon taxes, and other nonmarket pric-
ing mechanisms: When governments impose levies that are based 
on estimations of long term opportunity costs they face strong 
downward pressure from marketplace forces based on current 
market-set pricing. Rationales drawn from the natural and civic 
economies provide economic justification for pricing beyond the 
terms of current commodity markets. 
• Market based regulatory approaches: It is important to affirm 
that performance standards should be set on civic criteria, not 
market expediency. In emissions trading systems and other mar-
ket enlisting alternatives to command-and-control systems, for in-
stance, participants sometimes forget that the market is the 
means rather than the end. Evaluating tradeable allowances in 
terms that consider the consequences on natural systems and the 
public welfare of the civic economy provides a necessary check 
on the tendency to manage market based schemes in narrow mar-
ket terms. 
• The perspectives of the contending forces in contemporary pol-
icy debates: The narrowed interests of marketplace arguments 
can be usefully distinguished from the merits of arguments based 
on civic-societal good, a distinction that is often occluded. 58 "The 
bottom line" of individual marketplace players is very different 
from the society'S "bottom line." The former are fractionalized 
and incomplete; the latter is cumulative, integrally complete, and 
shared. Political analysis should note this difference in the two 
perspectives. 
• and so on .... 
Charting out three economies provides an analytical and concep-
tual vehicle for focusing analysis upon the ultimate fundamental ques-
tion of human governance: how are we to sustain human society on 
the planet with a satisfactory quality of life? The three economies 
present persuasive reasons for Justice Scalia and law-and-economics 
58. Note, for instance, how some "public interest law firms" chronicled by Professor 
Houck, supra note 51, are created and managed to serve marketplace interests, yet use the 
public interest label to imply that they, like most citizen public interest groups, are most 
concerned with the civic-societal realm. 
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theorists, if they truly wish to integrate the perceptions of economics 
into rules of law, to recognize logically necessary economic linkages 
between marketplace property rights and the economy of nature, and 
the legitimate demands of civic public interests beyond the narrow 
limits of common law.59 
SUMMARY 
How does one evaluate the important public values and impacts 
of things that do not have a market price and then integrate them into 
the fabric of our system of social governance? Joseph Sax's kaleido-
scopic intellectual interests have led him to explore a remarkable 
range of legal and philosophical issues that extend that inquiry far be-
yond discrete subject matter topics of environmental law. When Sax 
takes on these questions-the experience of wilderness, the logic of 
human nature that leads to destructive development, the meaning of 
sustainable development, the public trust as society's legacy from past 
to future, the strategic role of citizen action in democratic governance, 
and the separate reality of natural systems coexisting with human sys-
tems-he is an intergenerational educator charting out paths to an-
swers to important questions. 
Building on Professor Sax's hypothesis of two economies, and 
classic perceptions from environmental economics, this essay proposes 
the theory that there are three economies that must be understood in 
order to achieve a realistic analysis of how society does and should 
function, now and for the future. The dominant marketplace economy 
is central to daily economic and political life. It exists, however, 
within the context of two other economies. The economy of nature is 
an intricate underlying system of natural systems, operating under its 
own rules, that supplies resources and a sustaining context to humans. 
The marketplace's frequent use of the natural economy as a cumula-
tive receptor of externalized costs is often shortsighted and dysfunc-
tional. The civic-societal economy encompasses the marketplace 
economy but also comprises the overarching public interest, the full 
comprehensive reality of societal costs, benefits, and conditions lying 
beyond the marketplace, including the impact of direct externalities, 
and externalities passed through the natural economy. If quality of 
life is to be sustained through future generations, human society can-
not afford to be substantially dominated only by the daily economic 
and political machinery of the marketplace with its short term focus 
59. In Lucas, Justice Scalia asserted that regulations depriving land of its "economic 
benefit" constitutionally require compensation unless the restrictions are those "that back-
ground principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land own-
ership." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. This rule, as Sax notes, applies a purely market-based 
definition of economic benefit and property. 
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and narrowed scheme of values. Sustain ability requires that social 
governance must integrate the functional realities of the natural and 
civic-societal economies as well. 
